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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5364  
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0752  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0485  
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0742  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1140

S E C R E T BERN 000513

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/CPI (KMCGEEHAN), T, NEA/IR, EUR/PRA, AND  
EUR/CE (Y.SAIN-ANDRE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2033  
TAGS: [PARM](#) [KNNP](#) [MNUC](#) [EFIN](#) [GM](#) [IR](#) [SZ](#)  
SUBJECT: VISIT OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS  
OFFICIALS TO SWISS UNDERGROUND CONSTRUCTION FIRM: SWISS  
RESPONSE

REF: A. STATE 97389  
[1](#)B. BERN 476

Classified By: POL/E Counselor Richard A. Rorvig; reasons 1.4(b) and (d)  
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[1](#)1. (S) On October 1, Juergen Boehler, Head of the Export Control Licensing Division of the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) provided poloff the results of the Swiss government's investigation in response to the USG's information (reftels) that officials of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had planned to visit a Swiss company (Rowa). Boehler said that Rowa is a well-known Swiss company that specializes in underground construction for civilian applications. He said that Rowa had approached SECO in January 2007 regarding a tunnel boring project associated with the construction of a hydropower dam ("Sirvan Dam") in Iran. According to Boehler, SECO researched the dam project and assessed it to be legitimate. He commented that, at that time, SECO did not have information that the companies in Iran were of concern.

[1](#)2. (S) According to Boehler, the Rowa project would require exporting a tunnel boring machine to Iran. Boehler further reported that SECO had informed Rowa that, although the tunnel boring machine is not a controlled item, it is sensitive. He added that, because the boring machine itself was to be exported from Germany, the matter was in the hands of German authorities. Boehler emphasized that SECO has coordinated with German export control licensing authorities (BAFA) on this case. He noted that it was his understanding that Germany had not granted a license for the export of the tunnel boring machine to Iran, though he presumed that the USG might obtain this information firsthand from German officials.  
CARTER